Monetary policy, taxes and the business cycle by William T. Gavin et al.
      Research Division 
          Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 










William T. Gavin 
Finn E. Kydland 
and 














FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS 
Research Division 
P.O. Box 442  
St. Louis, MO 63166 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate 
discussion and critical comment. References in publications to Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working 
Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should be 
cleared with the author or authors.  





William T. Gavin  
Vice President  
Research Department  
Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis  
P.O. Box 442   






Finn E. Kydland 
Henley Professor in 
Economics 
Department of Economics 
University of California 







Michael R. Pakko  
Research Officer 
Research Department  
Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis 
P.O. Box 442   
St. Louis, MO 63166 
(314) 444-8564 
pakko@stls.frb.org
Original Date: August 16, 2004 
Revised May 31, 2006 
 
 
Keywords:  Inflation, Tax Code, Business Cycle 
 





This paper analyzes the interaction of inflation with the tax code and its contribution to 
aggregate fluctuations. We find significant effects operating through the tax on realized 
nominal capital gains.  A tax on nominal bond income magnifies these effects. Our 
innovation is to combine monetary policy shocks with non-indexed taxes in a model 
where the central bank implements policy using an interest rate rule. Monetary policy 
had important effects on the behavior of the business cycle before 1980 because 
policymakers did not exert effective control over inflation. Monetary policy reform 
around 1980 led to better control, and with more stable inflation, the effect of the 
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Introduction 
Does the interaction of inflation and the tax code contribute considerably to aggregate 
fluctuations?  There is a large body of work showing that the steady-state welfare effects of 
moderate inflation are large when nominal capital gains are taxed. These include the partial 
equilibrium analyses of Fischer (1981), Feldstein (1997), and Cohen, Hassett, and Hubbard 
(1999).
1   The literature also includes the steady-state analysis of general equilibrium models in 
Abel (1997), Leung and Zhang (2000), and Bullard and Russell (2004). In general equilibrium, 
the welfare costs arise because, for any given capital income tax rate, an increase in the inflation 
rate raises the real pre-tax rate of return to capital and lowers the after-tax return. The lower 
after-tax return causes a decline in the capital stock and a reduction in labor productivity. These 
analyses are about steady states and only suggestive about the cyclical impacts. This paper 
examines the dynamic implications for the interaction between inflation and the capital gains tax. 
We specify a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model that combines monetary 
policy shocks with taxes on nominal capital gains in a setting where the central bank implements 
policy using an interest rate rule. The use of an interest rate rule makes inflation highly 
persistent, leading to persistent changes in the expected marginal tax rate on real capital gains. 
We find that monetary policy had important effects on the behavior of the business cycle before 
1980 because the Fed did not respond aggressively to inflation shocks that were highly 
persistent. Monetary policy reform around 1980 led to lower and more stable inflation. A more 
credible commitment to price stability and a more aggressive response to inflation shocks has led 
                                                 
1 For empirical estimates of the burden of capital gain tax using panel data, see Poterba (1987) and 
Auerbach (1988). For survey of the tax policy issues and recent evidence, see Auerbach (2004).   
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to less persistent inflation dynamics and effectively eliminated the cyclical effects of the 
interaction between monetary policy and the nominal capital gains tax. 
Inflation persistence induces changes in expected tax rates. Dittmar, Gavin, and Kydland 
(2005) show that inflation persistence is common in models where the central bank uses an 
interest rate rule. When the central bank is using an interest rate rule, a persistent shock to the 
inflation trend appears as a shock to the inflation target. It leads to a persistent deviation of 
inflation from the steady state and, in the presence of a nominal tax on capital gains, causes a 
persistent change in the effective marginal tax rate on capital. Thus, a positive shock to the 
inflation objective distorts the consumption/saving decision and may have a long-lasting effect 
on capital accumulation.
2   
The next section describes the model with taxes on realized nominal capital gains as well 
as on income from labor, capital, and bonds. We then consider the model dynamics, showing 
how inflation affects the business cycle through the tax on nominal capital gains. As it turns out, 
only the taxes on capital gains and bond income are important for business cycle dynamics. The 
bond tax only matters if there is also a tax on capital gains.  Note that the current U.S. tax code 
continues to tax nominal income from bonds and realized capital gains. Finally, the model is 
used with the history of inflation shocks and estimates of inflation persistence to show how the 
interaction of monetary policy with the tax code has affected capital, hours, and productivity in 
the U.S. economy.  
                                                 
2 Altig and Carlstrom (1991) use an overlapping-generations model with nominal prices (but without money 
explicitly included) to show that the lack of perfect indexation for inflation in the tax code could have a large 
cyclical effect in principle. They find, however, that their model could not account for the magnitude of cyclical 
variation in hours worked and that it predicts a large decline in the capital stock in the 1980s that never materialized. 
We find that one crucial assumption in Altig and Carlstrom—the relatively low value assumed for inflation 
persistence—is likely to be important for these findings. 
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A Monetary Model with Nominal Taxes 
Technology 
Output is produced with a constant-returns-to-scale (CRTS) production technology: 
(1)                              
α α − = =
1 ) ( ) , ( t t t t t t t t t N x K z N x K F z Y , 
where zt is a stationary technology shock and xt is an index of labor-augmenting technical 
progress that increases at a deterministic (gross) growth rate 
) 1 /( 1 α γ
−
x . The implied growth rate for 
output, capital, and consumption, γx, defines a steady-state growth path for the real economy. 
  The firm sells output at price Pt, and purchases labor and capital services from the 
household at nominal wage Wt and rental price of capital Vt. Along with the CRTS assumption, 
profit-maximization under perfect competition implies that the real wage rate, wt=Wt/Pt, and rental 
price, vt=Vt/Pt, will be equated with the marginal products of labor and capital. 
  Capital—owned by the household—follows the law of motion 
(2)  1 (1 ) tt t KK I δ + =− +, 
where It is gross investment and δ is the depreciation rate. 
 
Government with a Nominal Tax Code 
A government issues money and collects revenues by imposing proportional taxes on 
nominal income from labor, bond interest, and capital ownership (with possibly differing tax 
rates). Government revenues, T, from income taxes are 
(3)  t
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where Rt is the nominal interest rate on bonds from the previous period. The third term in equation 
(3) represents the revenue from taxes assessed on capital returns net of depreciation charges. The   4
fourth term represents the tax on nominal capital gains.  We consider two alternative versions of 
the capital gains tax.  In the first, simple case, the capital gains tax is treated as an accrual tax, 
(4a)  t t t t K P P G ) ( 1 − − = . 
In the second version, the capital gains tax applies only to realized gains, with the representative 
household allowed to manage the timing of realization.  Specifically, the household is assumed to 
manage a stock of unrealized capital gains, Ut, subject to an adjustment-cost function that 
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with  , 0 > φ   , 0 > ′ φ  and  0 < ′ ′ φ .  We assume that the steady-state value of   U G U G / ) / ( = φ .  
Further details regarding the cost function are discussed in the calibration section. 
Revenues from the income taxes are returned to the household via a lump-sum rebate. 
This allows us to consider the pure distortionary effects of taxation, abstracting from wealth 
effects associated with reallocations between the public and private sectors.  The government 
transfers money to the public directly. 
Households 
A representative household maximizes a discounted stream of utility from consumption 
and leisure,  
 
                                                 
3 In the absence of any explicit portfolio management costs or other frictions, the problem is 
indeterminate.  Given a constant capital gains tax rate over time, agents are completely indifferent to the 
timing of capital gains realizations.  In response to changes in the tax rate, individuals have an incentive 
to realize all of their capital gains during the low-tax time period.  The introduction of a small portfolio 
management cost provides convexity to the problem, thus allowing for non-corner solutions. 
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subject to a nominal budget constraint and a constraint on the allocation of time. The household’s 
nominal budget constraint can be written 
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where 
M
t ∆ is the lump sum monetary transfer and , t T the tax refund, is taken as exogenous by the 
households.   
  The household endowment of time (normalized to 1) can be allocated to leisure, labor 
input to the production process, or transaction-related activities such as shopping and trips to the 
bank: 
(6) 1 = + + t t t S N L . 
The shopping-time function is increasing in the nominal value of consumption purchases and 














with ξ, η > 0. Note that the shopping-time function depends on pre-transfer money—a timing 
assumption used by Kydland (1989) that is also consistent with cash-in-advance timing. If we 
included the transfer, then it would be equivalent to end-of-period balances and more comparable 
with the analysis of models in which money enters the utility function directly. Both variants of 
shopping-time technology are discussed in Goodfriend and McCallum (1987). The only 
important result that depends on this timing is the real determinacy of the equilibrium with a   6
contemporaneous policy rule:  Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) show that the determinacy conditions 
may depend importantly on these somewhat arbitrary timing conventions.  
Growth Trends and Stationarity  
The price level grows at the trend inflation rate, γp, so the nominal values also share a 
common trend. In the computational experiments, we treat γ pt as stochastic, allowing for shocks 
to the inflation trend. To ensure that the government’s intertemporal budget constraint is 
satisfied, we impose the condition that the growth rate of bonds and money are cointegrated with 
the nominal growth trend, γ xγ p.  Stationarity also requires that the G/U ratio be constant over 
time, with each variable growing at the nominal growth trend. 
To solve for the model’s approximate dynamics, we require a stationary representation, 
which can be derived by deflating all real variables by (γx)
t and deflating all nominal variables by a 
similar index of the trend rate of inflation, (γp)
t .
4  The timing convention is such that Rt+1 
represents the return on a one-period bond from t to t+1, and γpt+1 represents the nominal trend 
growth rate from t to t+1. 
 
Stochastic General Equilibrium 
  The first-order conditions from the household’s problem, along with optimality conditions 
from the firm’s problem and equilibrium conditions for clearing the markets for goods and labor, 
determine the endogenous responses of the model to stochastic shocks. All that remains is to 
specify the behavior of government-controlled variables and other exogenous processes.  
                                                 
4 This transformation is now standard in this literature as described in King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988). See the 
appendix for solution details. 
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Without loss of generality, we will assume that government borrowing is zero in each 
period, so that the household’s first-order condition with respect to bonds defines the nominal 
interest rate. Tax rates are assumed to be constant and the central bank uses an interest rate rule to 
achieve an inflation target. Under the interest rate rule, the money stock is determined 
endogenously from the money demand relationship.  In preliminary results for this study, we 
found that none of our main qualitative results depended on having output in the policy rule. 
Therefore, we focus on policy in which the central bank responds only to deviations of inflation 
from a stochastic target. We do not attempt to explain why the central bank allows the inflation 
objective to be random; rather, we show one consequence of its doing so.
5 
Writing the policy rule in terms of log-deviations from a constant steady state: 
(8)                                        1 ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) , tt p t R ππ ϕ πϕ γ + =+ −  
where π ϕ is positive and large enough to guarantee a unique equilibrium.
 6  The deviation of the 
inflation target from the steady state inflation rate,  ˆ , pt γ  follows an exogenous autoregressive 
process,  1 ˆˆ , pt pt t
π
π γ ργ ε − =+  where the shock is assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed as
2 (0, ). N π σ   
The remaining exogenous variable, zt, is similarly assumed to follow a first-order 
autoregressive process calibrated from the data:   1 ,
z
tz t t zz ρ ε − =+  where 
z
t ε is assumed to be 
independent and identically distributed as
2 (0, ). z N σ   
                                                 
5 There is a large literature spawned by Delong (1997) and Sargent (1999) that attempts to explain why the Fed 
allowed inflation to follow a stochastic trend.  See Nelson (2005) for a recent summary and a monetarist 
interpretation. 
 
6 Edge and Rudd (2002) show that adding taxes to the model restricts the size of the parameter space for which the 
model has a unique equilibrium. In our model with the baseline calibration, 
π ϕ must be greater than 0.3.    8
The model we consider here is devoid of any of the nominal frictions that are often 
assumed to account for real effects of monetary policy.  Nevertheless, there are three interrelated 
features that generate non-superneutralities in our model.     
  From the household’s first-order conditions, we have 
(9)      1 1 ) 1 ( 1 )
~
1 ( + + − + = + t
B
t R R τ  
where  1
~
+ t R  denotes the after tax nominal rate, defined by  
     [ ] 1 1 1 ) ~ 1 ( )
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1 ( + + + + = + t t t t r E R π ,   
where  1 t π + is the gross inflation rate from period t to t+1,  t t pt p p / 1 + γ , and the corresponding 
after-tax real rate is defined by  
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where t λ is the marginal utility of consumption in period t. The implied coefficient on changes in 
the inflation target in the monetary policy rule, (7), is unity.  From (8), it is clear that the tax rate 
on bonds introduces a wedge between the nominal bond rate and the after-tax rate relevant to 
households.  Hence, a rise in inflation will cause after tax real interest rates to decline.   
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The last term in (10) reflects the taxation of nominal capital gains. The expression for the 
accrual-based capital gains tax is obtained by setting  ) / ( 1 1 + + ′ t t u g φ =1.  A higher inflation rate 
lowers after-tax returns to capital through this channel, lowering investment and capital   9
accumulation. This is the primary mechanism driving the model’s response to our policy shocks.  
The presence of a tax on nominal bond interest amplifies the transitory response of inflation to an 
inflation target shock, which amplifies the real effects of the capital gains tax. 
Inflation also matters because it lowers real returns on money and bonds. For a given 
baseline real return, an increase in inflation requires a higher nominal bond rate and a higher 
nominal return to money holdings in equilibrium. In the case of money, higher nominal returns 
are associated with lower real money balances and higher shopping-time costs.  
After some substitution from the household’s first-order conditions, the condition for 
optimal money holdings can be written in a form that can be interpreted as a money demand 
relationship: 



















= ⎢⎥ − ⎣⎦
. 
The expression looks complicated, but it actually has a familiar double-log form.  Calibrating the 
shopping-time function with η=1 implies an interest elasticity of -½ .
7 Note also that because 
consumption and productivity are cointegrated, the scale variable in the numerator of (11), 
[(y/N)c
η], implies a long-run income elasticity equal to unity.
8  Note that, in addition to the 
inflation tax, both the labor and bond tax rates affect real money demand.  
 
                                                 
7Pakko (1998) shows that a specification of this type is associated with real welfare effects of inflation that are 
consistent with the typical welfare-triangle analysis of the money demand literature.  
 
8 Because both consumption and labor productivity tend to be procyclical—but with smaller amplitude than 
output—the short-run income elasticity of the money demand relationship will be less than 1. 
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  Steady-State and Model Calibration 
  The model’s dynamics will be approximated as proportional deviations from a 
baseline steady state, defined by the model parameters (including the baseline growth rates of 
technology and prices, γx and γp). Our calibrations are based on long-run characteristics of the 
data and/or are common to the literature using computable general equilibrium models. The 
baseline calibration for the model is shown in Table 1.  
[Table 1] 
In our baseline calibration, the coefficient on the deviation of inflation from target (1+φπ) 
is set equal to 1.375.  This is less than the 1.5 that Taylor (1993) suggested for the post-1980 
data, but larger than many estimates using data from the earlier period. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 
(2000) estimate a value around 0.8 for (1+φπ) using U.S. data from the period before October 
1979. Lower values of φπ result in equilibria with more price variability and larger interactions 
between inflation shocks and the tax code. As noted in Edge and Rudd (2002), the inclusion of a 
bond tax increases the area of indeterminacy associated with interest rate rules—the region rises 
from unity to about 1.34 for our baseline calibration of the model.  
In principle, we could calibrate the time-series process for the inflation trend using data 
on either money growth or inflation. Because the U.S. data were generated in an economy in 
which the Fed usually followed an interest rate rule, the model suggests that we should calibrate 
the model to persistence in the inflation data, not the money growth data.
9 Gavin and Kydland 
(2000), Kim, Nelson, and Piger (2004), and many others, show that the autocorrelation of 
inflation dropped significantly after the policy change in October 1979. Therefore, we estimate 
the persistence in the inflation rate separately for pre- and post-October 1979 periods. Using an   11
augmented Dickey-Fuller method, we estimate the persistence to be 0.97 before October 1979 
and 0.84 afterwards. The standard deviation of the residual is approximately 0.4 percent at a 
quarterly rate in both periods. Under this specification, the lower unconditional variance of 
inflation after 1979 is all due to lower persistence.  Our baseline case is set to the pre-1979 
estimate.  
Steady-state tax rates for labor, interest, capital income, and the capital gains tax are set 
to equal the average marginal tax rates for 1960 to 2002, calculated using the NBER TAXSIM 
model and reported in Table 9 of Feenberg and Poterba (2003). They report 24 percent for labor, 
26 percent for interest income, 34 percent for capital income, and 20 percent for realized capital 
gains.  
Calibration of the parameters of the capital gains accrual equation, (4b) requires 
quantitative restrictions on the adjustment cost function, ). / ( U G φ   As mentioned earlier, 
U G U G / ) / ( = φ is assumed so that the adjustment costs apply only to deviations from the steady 
state.  On average, for this period, realized capital gains were about 40 percent of changes in the 
nominal capital stock measured as the net stock of private nonresidential assets.  Accordingly, 
we calibrate the steady state ratio of capital gains realized to capital gains accrued, 
1 [/ ( )] ttt t GPPK − − , to equal 0.4.  From equation (4b), this calibration results in a steady-state G/U 
ratio of 0.0094 (the ratio of capital gains realized to accumulated unrealized gains). Note these 
ratios are so low because some capital gains are never realized.  Some are held by tax exempt 
institutions such as pension funds and some are bequeathed to heirs, in which case the basis for 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 See Balke and Wynne (2004) for an identification procedure which uses M2 and disaggregated price data to 
identify the monetary policy shock to the trend in M2 growth.    12
the capital gains is reset to the current market value and no capital gain tax is paid (the estate 
may be taxed, however).   
In order to calculate the linearly approximated version of the model, the first two 
derivatives of ) / ( U G φ also require calibration.  From the first order condition determining the 
optimal accumulation of unrealized capital gains, the first derivative is equal to the steady-state 
nominal interest rate (see appendix). The elasticity of marginal adjustment costs with respect to 
the G/U ratio, ζ =  ) / ( / ) / ( ) / ( U G U G U G φ φ ′ ′ ′ , is calibrated to be consistent with Auerbach’s 
(1988) regression results showing that a one-percent increase in the capital gains tax rate is 
associated with a 0.56 decline in realized capital gains.  A simulation experiment using the time 
series property of Auerbach’s data on capital gains realizations generates approximately this 
result with an elasticity measure ζ equal to -1.1. 
Balcer and Judd (1987) model the complexity of the tax code in a life cycle model and 
argue that, in a frictionless world with complete markets, the effective marginal tax rate would 
be negligible. Nevertheless, in a study of a panel of 13,000 individual tax returns collected 
throughout the period from 1985 to1994, Auerbach, Burman, and Siegel (2000) measure the 
marginal effect tax rates by income class. They find that all but highest income class paid the 
statutory rate on realized capital gains. Those in the highest class, the most sophisticated 
taxpayers, faced effective marginal tax rates that were about 90 percent of the statutory rates.   
In the final section, we include sensitivity analysis for particular parameters that are 
important for the results. These include parameters in the monetary policy rule,   and  , π π ϕ ρ  The 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, , σ  and the steady state ratio of capital gains realized to those 
accrued,  1 /( ) . ttt t GPPK − −  
   13
Steady-State Welfare Costs 
  The main operative mechanism of the model—the interaction of inflation with the 
nominal tax code—is illustrated in the steady-state welfare calculations presented in Table 2. 
[Table 2] 
The small welfare costs of inflation attributable to non-neutrality from the shopping-time 
function are shown in the first row. These losses are associated with typical “welfare triangle” 
type calculations:  Higher rates of inflation induce households to economize on real money 
holdings, requiring greater shopping time (at the expense of leisure and work effort). For an 
inflation rate of 10 percent, output and consumption are only 0.44 percent lower than they would 
be in a zero-inflation steady state. Leisure is only marginally lower than in the zero-inflation 
environment. The final two columns of the table show the combined effects of lower 
consumption and leisure on household utility, using a measure of compensating variation 
calculated as the κ that solves 
(11)  
0 0 10 10 , ) 1 (( ) , ( t t t t L c U L c U κ − = ) , 
where superscripts denote the steady-state inflation rate. For the first row, this value represents a 
cost of only 0.49 percent of steady-state consumption in the zero-inflation environment.  The 
second row shows that—with  the exception of the capital gains tax—the addition of taxes to the 
model has almost no effect on the welfare costs of inflation. 
  The third and fourth rows show the dramatic effect that nominal taxation of capital gains 
has on the steady state.  The third row shows the results using the accrual-based specification.  In 
the high-inflation environment, output is 12.13 percent lower than it would be at zero inflation, 
while consumption is lowered by 8.49 percent. The main effect of inflation is revealed in the 
capital/output ratio, which is about 14.69 percent lower in the 10 percent inflation regime. As a   14
result, wages and employment are lower (so that leisure is actually higher for this case). In terms 
of the compensating variations, 10 percent inflation represents a cost of 7.03 percent of steady-
state consumption, or 5.59 percent of output.   
As shown in the fourth row of Table 2, the ability to shift tax capital gains taxation into 
the infinite future mitigates the steady state welfare effects of inflation.  The 10 percent inflation 
environment is associated with a 2.98 percent decline in output and a 2.09 percent decline in 
consumption.  The associated compensating variations are 1.79 percent and 1.41 percent.  
Although these measures are considerably smaller than found using the accrual-based capital 
gains tax, they are an order of magnitude larger than the welfare costs implied by the model 
without any nominal capital gains taxation.
10  In the model, the 10 percent increase in steady-
state inflation results in a permanent decline in the G/U-ratio of about 0.66 percent.   
  These calculations confirm that our model framework captures the effects highlighted by 
Feldstein, Fisher, and others—namely, that the nominal taxation of capital gains interacts with 
inflation to suppress capital accumulation. The model dynamics presented below show how this 
mechanism can generate real fluctuations in response to stochastic inflation. 
 
Model Dynamics  
This section reports computational experiments that show how the model economy 
responds to monetary policy shocks under alternative assumptions about tax and monetary 
policies.  Before turning to the issue of how inflation and taxes interact to generate model 
                                                 
10 Welfare effects for the accrual-based capital gains tax can be made approximately equal to the realization-based 
measures by using an accrual-equivalent tax rate of approximately 4 pecent. This is close to the rate calculated by 
Bailey (1969) and assumed by Feldstein and Summers (1979).   
   15
dynamics, it is instructive to consider the response of the model to changes in the capital gains 
tax.  Figure 1 shows how reported capital gains and the portfolio of unreported gains respond to a 
persistent 10 percent increase in the capital gains tax rate. We calibrate the persistence in the 
average marginal tax rate on capital gains to be equal to the largest root in the time series process 
using U.S. data from 1954 to 2001.
11  The tax change is known one period before it goes into 
effect.  In our model, a  persistent 10 percent increase in the tax rate, beginning in the next 
period, will cause investors to increase realizations by 4 percent in the period before the higher 
tax becomes effective. In the first period following the shock, realizations fall 5 percent below 
the steady state, but return to the trend within a few years. Unrealized gains rise gradually to 
about 1.45 percent above trend after nine years and then return very gradually to the steady state. 
[Figure 1] 
In our baseline calibration, inflation reacts more than one for one with a persistent shock 
to the inflation target. Figure 2 shows the response of inflation to a persistent 1 percent shock to 
the nominal growth trend, γp, with and without a tax on bond income. Without the bond tax, a 1 
percent shock to the inflation trend causes the inflation rate to jump to 0.8 percent before 
gradually returning to the steady state. With the 26 percent tax on interest income, the inflation 
rate jumps to almost 3 percent and decays gradually.  Here, the relatively weak response of 
policy to the inflation shock causes a significant magnification of the inflation target shock on 
the current inflation rate. 
[Figure 2] 
The effect on the real economic dynamics of our model is best seen by comparing the 
response of the capital stock under these alternative regimes. The impulse responses of the 
                                                 
11 The time series on capital gains tax rates are from Feenberg and Poterba (2003) and Auerbach (1988)--for the   16
capital stock to a monetary policy shock under four tax regimes are shown in Figure 3. The tax 
regime with the smallest impact is the one with the seigniorage tax only. Here, a persistent 1 
percent shock to the inflation target causes capital to decline only a tiny fraction of a percent. 
When we include all taxes except capital gains taxes, the maximum decline is about 0.29 percent 
after a decade. The decline is entirely due to the bond tax because it drives a larger wedge 
between the before- and after-tax interest rate. The interesting cases are those with a capital gains 
tax, with and without a bond tax. Braun (1994) and McGrattan (1994) show that both the labor 
tax and the capital income tax have large welfare effects.  These effects, however, do not change 
with inflation and do not interact with fluctuations in the inflation rate as does the bond tax.
12  In 
the third tax regime, we reinstate the capital gains tax but eliminate the tax on bond income. Here 
the peak effect is a 0.57 percentage decline in the capital stock that persists for several decades. 
When we include all taxes, the total effect is almost an order of magnitude larger. A 1 percent 
shock raising the inflation target reduces the capital stock by 3.0 percent by the 12
th year. The 
bond tax is important because it magnifies the impact on inflation (see Figure 1) and therefore 
magnifies the increase in the effective tax on capital gains. 
[Figure 3] 
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses of some key macroeconomic variables following a 
1 percent inflation shock. Both output and hours worked decline sharply upon impact with the 
decline in investment. Output follows capital stock along a protracted path of below the steady 
state. Hours converge back to the steady state with a convergence rate that has a half-life of 
about 6 years. The model produces a counterfactual increase in consumption because there is no 
cost of adjusting capital and it is freely consumed if the stock is too high. The lower left-hand 
                                                                                                                                                             
years before 1960. The time series has an AR(1) coefficient equal to 0.83 in annual data.     17
panel of Figure 4 shows that this effect is quite short-lived compared with the long period of 
depressed consumption that follows an inflationary shock. Labor productivity also displays a 
short-lived increase upon impact, followed by a long period of convergence back to the trend. 
[Figure 4] 
Business Cycle Effects 
  Next, we turn to the question posed at the beginning, “Does the interaction of inflation 
and the tax code contribute considerably to aggregate fluctuations?” We calculate the business 
cycle effects under two separate regimes for inflation: In the first regime, the policy parameters 
are those used as our baseline.  They were chosen to reproduce the volatile and persistent 
inflation observed in the period before October 1979. The autoregressive parameter on the 
inflation target shock, ρπ, is set to 0.97 and the central bank’s reaction to the deviation of 
inflation from target, (1+φπ), is set to 1.375.  For the period after October 1979, we choose 
parameters that reproduce the relative price stability observed since.  The persistence parameter 
is lowered to 0.84 and the Fed’s reaction to inflation is raised to 1.5, the value suggested by 
Taylor (1993) looking at post 1980 data. In each of the computational experiments, the 
technology shock is assumed to have a first-order AR parameter of 0.95 and a shock variance of 
0.0075.  
[Table 3] 
Table 3 shows standard deviations and correlations with output for some key 
macroeconomic variables, comparing versions of the model with alternative capital gains tax 
assumptions. In both the top and bottom panels, the first block of results report the second 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 Chang (1995) considered the capital income tax, but also did not investigate the interaction with inflation.   18
moments calculated using U.S. data. The second block reports the model results when there is no 
capital gains tax, but there are taxes on income from labor, capital and interest as well as an 
inflation tax.  In the third block, we report the results of an experiment in which nominal capital 
gains are taxed on accrual, but where the tax rate is lowered from 20 percent to 4 percent.
13 This is 
the rate that replicates the steady state welfare consequences of our model when taxes are paid on 
realization. The last block reports the results when we give households the opportunity to choose 
when to realize capital gains and allow 60 percent of the gains to avoid taxation altogether. 
The top panel reports results for the early period. The model without capital gains taxes 
accounts for 75 percent of the variability in the cyclical standard deviation in output. In this 
simple model without the capital gains tax, the variability of hours is low and the comovement 
between output and other variables far too high relative to the data—particularly for productivity. 
These moments are nearly identical to those that would obtain in a model without either taxes or 
inflation. Persistent shocks to the inflation objective have no measurable impact on output in the 
model without a capital gains tax.  
The inclusion of the accrual-based tax raises the standard deviation of output fluctuations 
by 7 percent. The low correlation of consumption with output reflects the initial rise in 
consumption that occurs as households adjust to changes in the desired capital stock. The resulting 
increase in the expected future effective capital gains tax causes households to consume capital on 
impact, generating a relatively low contemporaneous correlation with output (0.52). Adding the 
capital gains tax increases the standard deviation of each of the variables considered. The standard 
deviation of hours is approximately 46 percent larger in the model with a capital gains tax. In 
addition, the inclusion of capital gains taxes introduces a propagation channel for inflation shocks 
                                                 
13 It is interesting to note that Protopapadakis (1983) argues that accrual-equivalent marginal tax rates were perhaps   19
that lowers the high correlation between output and other macroeconomic variables that is typical 
the baseline RBC model.   
 The right block includes the results with the realization-based capital gains tax. The 
statistics are very similar to case with the 4 percent accrual tax. The cyclical effect of the inflation-
tax interaction is only slightly lower than in the case of the accrual-based tax.  There is slightly 
larger reduction in the standard deviations of hours. The biggest difference with the capital gains 
tax, either the accrual-equivalent or the realization-based tax, is that investment becomes more 
volatile than observed in the data.  Other variables—hours, in particular—become more volatile, 
but the variability remains below that of output. Inflation target shocks have real effects because 
they change expected future tax rates.  That the accrual-equivalent is close to the realization-based 
tax was suggested by Viard (2000), who found that the asset pricing implications of expected 
future tax changes were similar in accrual and realization based tax systems. 
In the later period, with ρπ = 0.84, the qualitative results are similar but much smaller. 
The standard deviation of output deviations is no higher than it is without the capital gains tax. 
Overall, except for a slight rise in the volatility of investment, there appear to be no measurable 
cyclical effects of adding the capital gains tax when persistence in the inflation target shock is as 
low as 0.84.  
The statistics for U.S. data reported in Table 3 illustrate the widely documented decline in 
the volatility of real macroeconomic variables during the 1980s. The analysis of the model 
suggests that the lower persistence of inflation since 1979 might have played a partial role in this 
volatility decrease. With high persistence in the inflation process, inflation shocks interact with 
the capital gains tax to have large effects on real variables.  
                                                                                                                                                             
as low as 5 percent.    20
 
Simulations of U.S. Data 
 The computational experiments suggest that we should see important effects from the 
interaction of inflation and the capital gains tax before 1980, but the effects may be too small to 
be measurable afterwards. To illustrate this feature of the model, we use estimated shocks to the 
inflation trend to see what our model implies for movements of capital, hours worked, and labor 
productivity in U.S. history, assuming a policy break in 1979:Q3. We use the same calibrations 
for the policy process that are used in Table 3. The contribution of estimated inflation shocks to 
the real economy is summarized in Figure 5. 
[Figure 5] 
  In the period leading up to 1980, the effects of the interaction between inflation and the 
capital gains tax are large enough to be measurable.  As we saw in Figure 2, the effects on the 
capital stock go on for such a long time that the damage from rising inflation in the 1960s and 
1970s continued to have a depressing effect on the capital stock into the 1990s. The stabilization 
of the price level after the Korean war led to a rise in the capital stock to 4 percent above the 
steady state in 1965.  The acceleration of inflation in the 1960s and 1970s caused the capital 
stock to fall 2.4 percent below the zero inflation steady state by 1980.  Since then, the effects of 
the earlier inflation on the capital stock have gradually dissipated. 
  The impact on labor input works through the economy quickly. The upward drift of 
inflation caused hours worked to fall below the steady-state level for most of the 1970s. 
Corresponding to the inflationary effects of the oil price shocks of the 1970s, the model implies 
sharp declines in employment associated with those events. The severity of the 1975 recession 
was attributed to the negative effect of high relative oil prices on the efficiency of the existing   21
capital stock. Wei (2003) calibrates a vintage capital model to the U.S. economy and shows that 
such a model cannot explain the negative response of hours worked and output to the sharp spike 
in the relative price oil. Our model suggests that the Fed’s reaction to the oil price shock that 
raised inflation expectations may help to explain the episode. Since 1980, the effect on hours 
worked is insignificant.  
  The impact on productivity reflects a combination of the effect on the capital stock and 
on hours worked. The upward drift in inflation combined with the nominal tax on capital gains to 
exert an increasingly negative impact on labor productivity from the late 1960s until after 1980. 
Since the 1980s, this effect led to a small, but steady, rise in labor productivity.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
   The goal in this paper is to analyze the business cycle consequences of interaction 
between inflation policy and a non-indexed tax system. There are reasons that our baseline case 
may over- or underestimate the effects of inflation operating through the tax code. In Figure 6, 
we show how the standard deviation of output fluctuations (deviations from an HP trend) depend 
on the parameters that are important for our results. The dashed lines show the results when the 
capital gains tax is set to zero. 
First, the Fed’s policy parameters are critically important for inducing these business 
cycle effects. In the upper left panel of Figure 6, we show how the results depend on the Taylor 
rule parameter, φπ. We assume that the policy parameter is large enough to determine a unique 
equilibrium. The notion that policy during the 1970s was close to the region of indeterminacy 
(which begins around 0.34 for our baseline calibration) suggests that this may be an important 
source of business cycle fluctuations. A relatively small value of φπ would interact with the   22
capital gains tax to make output more variable. If the parameter is raised to 0.5, much of the 
extra variability disappears, even with the highly autocorrelated inflation shocks. 
[Figure 6] 
The upper right panel shows that the persistence of inflation target shocks is also 
important. Stock (1991) shows that when using the augmented Dickey-Fuller procedure, 
estimated values of the largest root close to unity have very wide confidence intervals and are 
biased downward. Stock’s bias adjustment for our case makes the value very close to one.  In a 
recent study of the Fed’s implied inflation targets, Ireland (2005) finds a random walk in the 
inflation target throughout the post-war period. Many studies in the macroeconomic time-series 
literature finds a unit root in the inflation process for this early period. In recent research on 
inflation expectations embedded in the yield curve, Kozicki and Tinsley (2005), Ellingsen and 
Soderstrom (2004), and Dewachter and Lyrio (2006) all present evidence that shocks to long-run 
inflation expectations are the major source of volatility in long-term bond yields. Using data 
from the bond market on comparable indexed and non-indexed bonds for a recent period, 
Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2003) find that the one-year forward rate, 10 years ahead, 
responds significantly to macroeconomic news because expected inflation at that horizon 
responds to news. They attribute this effect to the Federal Reserve’s decision not to choose an 
explicit numerical objective for the long-run inflation trend. Nevertheless, many others have 
estimated lower values for the largest root in the inflation series.  For example, using Bayesian 
methods, Kim, Nelson, and Piger (2004) estimate the posterior mean of the persistence parameter 
to be 0.94 before 1979:Q2. The upper right panel in Figure 6 shows that the variability of output 
is very sensitive to the values of this parameter, ρπ, for values above 0.97. We calibrate the post-
1979 policy parameter to be 0.84, where the business-cycle effects of the inflation-capital gains   23
tax interaction are very small. In this model, changing either one of the policy parameters would 
effectively eliminate these effects.  
In the case of both parameters,  and  , π π ϕ ρ  there are reasonable values at which monetary 
policy can explain some of the output variation, even with no capital gains tax. This is due to the 
magnification of inflation shocks by the tax on nominal bond income. Still the effects are small 
relative to those that occur with the tax on capital gains. 
  In the bottom left panel, we show how the results depend upon our assumption about the 
steady state ratio of capital gains realized to those accrued. Obviously, there is no effect of this 
ratio if there is no capital gains tax. In the bottom right hand panel, we consider the coefficient on 
relative risk aversion, a utility parameter that is particularly important for our results. Balcer and 
Judd (1987) report that the results should be sensitive to the curvature of the utility function. We 
find that is true. As the degree of risk aversion rises, the effect of the capital gains tax declines. 
Even without the capital gains tax, the cyclical variability depends on this parameter, but clearly 
the presence of the capital gains tax and certain monetary policies can exacerbate the effects. The 
cyclical effects of persistent nominal shocks operating through the capital gains tax appear to be 
measurable in specifications where the coefficient of relative risk aversion is less than 4.   
 
Conclusion  
When the central bank operates with an interest rate, persistent shocks to the 
inflation target can have large real effects on the business cycle if the tax system is not 
indexed for inflation. In our model, there is a tax on realized nominal capital gains. The 
business cycle effects of inflation interacting with the tax code were large before 1980 both 
because the shocks to the inflation target were highly persistent and because the Fed   24
responded weakly to deviations of inflation from target. Monetary policy reform around 
1980 led to better control of inflation, and with more stable inflation, the effect of the 
interaction between monetary policy and the nominal capital gains tax has become 
negligible. 
We present a model of the capital gains realization problem in a representative agent 
setting. Using a common calibration for all parameters except for those in the monetary policy 
function, we find that bad monetary policy may partially explain the slowdown in productivity 
growth before 1980. The upward trend in the average inflation rate interacted with the tax on 
nominal capital gains to reduce productivity growth in the 1960s and 1970s. Better policy after 
1980 may partially explain the revival of productivity and the lower variability of real variables 
since then.  
We find that accrual equivalent capital gains tax rate of 4 percent results in the same 
welfare costs of a 10 percent inflation as we get with the realization based tax and a 20 percent tax 
rate. This estimate of an accrual-equivalent rate is in line with earlier estimates by Bailey (1969) 
and Protopapadakis (1983).  We also find that the business cycle effects of the 4 percent accrual-
equivalent tax are about the same as the effects using a 20 percent tax on realized gains.  
Our study is aimed at understanding business cycle effects, not welfare effects. The 
welfare effects of these taxes may be quite large even if the cyclical effects are negligible. The 
results in this paper suggest that taking account of them would be important for understanding 
the nature of the U.S. economy, especially before 1980.  One explanation given for the relative 
stability of the post-1980 economy is that monetary policy was much improved.  This article 
demonstrates one channel for real effects of monetary policy that is consistent with that 
explanation.   25
References  
Abel, Andrew B. Comment on “The Costs and Benefits of Going from Low Inflation to Price 
Stability,” by Martin Feldstein in Reducing Inflation : Motivation and Strategy, eds. 
Christina D. Romer and David H. Romer, 156-66. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
1997. 
 
Altig, David, and Charles Carlstrom, “Inflation, Personal Taxes, and Real Output: A Dynamic 
Analysis,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 23(3), Part II (August 1991), 547-571.  
 
Auerbach, Alan J. “Taxpayer Behavior and Government Policy,” NBER Reporter Winter 2004. 
 
Auerbach, Alan J. “Capital Gains Taxation in the United States: Realizations, Revenue, and 
Rhetoric,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1988:2, 595-631. 
 
Auerbach, Alan J., Leonard E. Burman, and Jonathan M. Siegel.  “Capital Gains Taxation and 
Tax Avoidance: New Evidence from Panel Data,” in Joel B. Slemrod, ed., Does Atlas 
shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich, Cambridge and London: 
Harvard University Press, 2000, 355-88. 
 
Balcer, Yves, and Kenneth L. Judd. “Effects of Capital Gains Taxation on Life-Cycle Investment 
and Portfolio Management,” Journal of Finance 42 (July 1987), 743-58. 
 
Balke, Nathan S., and Mark A. Wynne. “Sectoral Effects of Monetary Shocks,” Manuscript, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, November 2004. 
 
Bailey, Martin J. “Capital Gains and Income Taxation,” in Arnold Haberger and Martin Bailey, 
eds., The Taxation of Income from Capital.  Washington, DC:  Brookings Institution, 
1969, 11-49. 
 
Braun, R. Anton. “Tax Disturbances and Real Economic Activity,” Journal of Monetary 
Economics 33 (1994), 441-462. 
 
Bullard, James B., and Steven H. Russell. “How Costly Is Sustained Low Inflation for the US 
Economy?” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 86 (May/June 2004), 35-67. 
 
Carlstrom, Charles T., and Timothy S. Fuerst. "Timing and Real Indeterminacy in Monetary 
Models," Journal of Monetary Economics 47 (2001), 285-298. 
 
Chang, Ly-June. “Business Cycles with Distorting Taxes and Disaggregated Capital Markets,” 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 19 (1995), 985-1009. 
 
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler. “Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic 
Stability: Evidence and Some Theory,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (February 
2000), 147-180. 
   26
Cohen, Darrel, Kevin A. Hassett, and R. Glenn Hubbard. “Inflation and the User Cost of Capital: 
Does Inflation Still Matter?” in The Costs and Benefits of Price Stability, ed. Martin 
Feldstein, 199-230. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. 
 
DeLong, J. Bradford (1997). “America’s Peacetime Inflation: the 1970s.” In C.D. Romer and 
D.H. Romer (eds.), Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 247–276. 
 
Dewachter, Hans, and Marco Lyrio. “Macro Factors and the Term-Structure of Interest Rates,” 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 38 (February 2006), 119-140. 
 
Dittmar, Robert D., William T. Gavin, and Finn E. Kydland. “Inflation Persistence and Flexible 
Prices,” International Economic Review 46 (February 2005), 245-61. 
 
Edge, Rochelle M., and Jeremy B. Rudd. “Taxation and the Taylor Principle,” Division of 
Research and Statistics, Federal Reserve Board, October 31, 2002. 
 
Ellingsen, Tore, and Ulf Söderström. “Why Are Long Rates Sensitive to Monetary Policy?” 
IGIER Working Paper n. 256, March 2004.  
 
Feenberg, Daniel R., and James M. Poterba. “The Alternative Minimum Tax and Effective 
Marginal Tax Rates,” NBER Working Paper 10072, November 2003. 
 
Feldstein, Martin. “ The Costs and Benefits of Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability,” in 
Reducing Inflation : Motivation and Strategy, eds. Christina D. Romer and David H. 
Romer, 123-56. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1997. 
 
Feldstein, Martin, and Lawrence Summers.  “Inflation and the Taxation of Capital Income in the 
Corporate Sector.”  National Tax Journal 32 (1979), 445-70. 
 
Fischer, Stanley. “Towards an Understanding of the Costs of Inflation : II,” Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy 15 (1981), 5-42. 
 
Gavin, William T., and Finn E. Kydland, “The Nominal Facts and the October 1979 Policy 
Change,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 82 (November/December 2000), 
39-61. 
 
Goodfriend, Marvin S., and Bennett T. McCallum. “Money: Theoretical Analysis of the Demand 
for Money,” in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economic Theory and Doctrine eds. 
Eatwell, et al., New York: Stockton Press, 1987.  
 
Gürkaynak, Refet S., Brian Sack, and Eric Swanson. “The Excess Sensitivity of Long-Term 
Interest Rates: Evidence and Implications for Macroeconomic Models,” Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System Finance and Economics Discussion Series 
2003-50, August 13, 2003. 
   27
Ireland, Peter N. “Changes in the Federal Reserve’s Inflation Target: Causes and Consequences,” 
Manuscript, Boston University, January 2005. 
 
Kim, Chang-Jin, Charles R. Nelson, and Jeremy Piger. “The Less-Volatile U.S. Economy: A 
Bayesian Investigation of Timing, Breadth, and Potential Explanations,” Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics 22 (January 2004), 80-93. 
 
King, Robert G., Charles I. Plosser, and Sergio T. Rebelo. “Production, Growth, and Business 
Cycles,” Journal of Monetary Economics 21 (1988), 195-232. 
 
Kozicki, Sharon, and Peter A. Tinsley. “Permanent and Transitory Policy Shocks in an Empirical 
Macro Model with Asymmetric Information,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control, 29 (November 2005), 1985-2015. 
 
Kydland, Finn E. “Monetary Policy in Models with Capital,” in Dynamic Policy Games, eds. van 
der Ploeg, F. and A. J. de Zeeuw. Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. (North-Holland). 
1989. 
 
Leung, Charles Ka Yui and Guang-Jia Zhang, “Inflation and Capital Gains Taxes in a Small 
Open Economy,” International Review of Economics and Finance 9 (2000), 195-208. 
 
McGrattan, Ellen R. “The Macroeconomic Effects of Distortionary Taxation,” Journal of 
Monetary Economics 33 (1994), 573-601. 
 
Nelson, Edward, “The Great Inflation of the Seventies: What Really Happened?” Advances in 
Macroeconomics 5(1) Berkley Electronic Press (2005), 1-47. 
 
Pakko, Michael R. “Shoe-Leather Costs of Inflation and Credibility,” Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis Review 80(6) (November/December 1998), 37-50. 
 
Poterba, James M. “How Burdensome are Capital Gains Taxes? Evidence from the United 
States,” Journal of Public Economics 33 (1987), 157-172. 
   
Protopapadakis, Aris. “Some Indirect Evidence on Effective Capital Gains Tax Rates,” Journal 
of Business 56 (1983), 127-138. 
 
Sargent, Thomas J. (1999). The Conquest of American Inflation. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Stock, James  H. “Confidence Intervals for the Largest Autoregressive Root in U.W. 
Macroeconomic Times Series,” Journal of Monetary Economics 28 (1991), 435-459. 
 
Taylor, John B. “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference 
Series on Public Policy 39 (1993),195-214. 
   28
Viard, Alan D. “Dynamic Asset Pricing Effects and Incidence of Realization-Based Capital 
Gains Taxes,” Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000), 465-488. 
 
Wei, Chao. "Energy, the Stock Market and the Putty-Clay Investment Model," American 
Economic Review, March 2003, 93(1), pp. 311-324.    29
 
Appendix:  First-Order Conditions and Steady-State Calibration 
 
This appendix details the equations for the model with a realization-based capital gains 
tax.  To solve for the model’s approximate dynamics, we require a stationary representation, 
which can be derived by deflating all real variables by (γx)
t and deflating all nominal variables by 
a similar index of the trend rate of inflation, (γp)
t .  The resulting transformed household 
optimization problem, in which all nominal and real variables are stationary, can be written 
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In the transformed problem, lower-case variables represent inflation-adjusted, growth-adjusted 
stationary variables.  
The first-order conditions to the household’s optimization problem can be expressed as  
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where λt, ωt, and φt are utility-denominated, present-valued shadow prices associated with 
constraints (A1), (A2) and (A3), respectively, and  t t pt t p p / 1 1 1 + + + =γ π .  
Equation (A4) sets the marginal utility of consumption equal to the shadow goods price 
plus a factor reflecting the shopping-time cost. Equations (A5) and (A6) determine the shadow 
value of time and reflect the optimal condition that the marginal utility of leisure is equal to an 
after-tax wage rate (denominated in utility units).  Equation (A7) relates the capital gains tax rate 
to the marginal portfolio adjustment cost.  Equations (A8) and (A9) represent the marginal 
efficiency conditions for holding nominal assets (money and bonds), while (A10) determines 
optimal capital accumulation.  In the accrual-based version of the model, the ratio (φ t +1/λ t +1) is 
replaced by  . 1
G
t+ τ   The accrual-based version of the model also omits equations (A3), (A7) and 
(A11) – which  determines the optimal accumulation of unrealized capital gains. 
From the firm’s profit-maximization condition, the marginal product of labor is equal to 
the real wage, 
(A12) ) / )( 1 ( t t t N y w α − = , 
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and the firm’s demand for capital determines that the real rental price will be equal to capital’s 
marginal product: 
(A13) ) / ( t t t k y v α = . 
Equations (A4) and (A10), along with a transformed stationary representation of the capital 
accumulation equation, 
(A14)  1 (1 ) xt t t kk i γ δ + =− + , 
imply household demand functions for consumption and real investment—and, hence, the future 
capital stock, kt+1. The presence of marginal shopping-time costs in the consumption-demand 















demonstrates one source of non-neutrality in the model. In addition, the presence of πt in equation 
(A8) implies another source of interaction between the goods market and the nominal asset market.  
Assuming equilibrium in the nominal asset markets, the condition for equilibrium in the 
goods market can be derived from the household’s budget constraint, 
(A16)  t t t i c y + = , 
and the production function, 
(A17) 
α α − =
1
t t t t N k z y . 
Equilibrium in the goods market determines consumption, investment, and output—with the 
equilibrating price being the shadow value of capital, λt+1; i.e., the after-tax real interest rate,  
1
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Steady-State Relationships 
Several key steady-state ratios are useful for deriving values for the remaining model 
parameters and for specifying the linear approximations used to calculate the model’s dynamics.  
First, equations (A10) and (A13) can be used to derive the steady-state capital/output ratio: 
(A18) 
(1 )
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From (A5) and (A6), the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is 
related to the two shadow prices and the parameters of the shopping-time function. Substituting 

































Given a calibrated allocation of time among labor, leisure, and shopping—along with a value of 
η (selected to generate money demand elasticity) and the consumption/output ratio from (A20)—
equation (A21) determines the value of the parameter θ to be used. 
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which defines the steady-state ratio of nominal output to money (velocity). With this value in 
hand, we can use the shopping-time definition (A15), along with the consumption-output ratio 
above, to specify a value for the scale parameter, ξ, consistent with the calibrated allocation of 
time for shopping. 
  The steady-state version of capital gains realization equation (A3) is: 
(A23)  g k u p p x − − = − ) / 1 1 ( ) 1 ( γ γ γ . 
Noting that the average of realized capital gains is approximately equal to 40% of total changes 
in the nominal value of the capital stock, equation (A23) implies a value of approximately 0.01 
for the G/U-ratio.   
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Given the normalizing assumption that the steady state value of  u g u g / ) / ( = φ , equation (A24) 
defines the steady state value of the first derivative of the adjustment-cost function, ) / ( u g φ′ .  
The final value needed to calibrate the adjustment cost function, its second derivative, is 
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Parameter Symbol  Value 
Depreciation rate  δ  0.02 
Discount factor  β  0.99 
Relative risk aversion  σ  2 
Capital share in production  α  0.38 
Shopping-time parameter  η  1 
Steady-state share of time labor time  N  0.3 
Steady-state share of shopping time  S  0.003 
     
Labor tax rate   τ
N  0.24 
Capital tax rate  τ
K  0.34 
Bond tax rate  τ
B  0.26 
Capital-gains tax rate  τ
G  0.20 
Steady-state ratio of realized to accumulated  
capital gains  G/U  0.0094 
Elasticity of marginal adj costs w.r.t G/U                        ζ          -1.1 
     
Steady-state output growth  γx  1.004 
Steady-state inflation  γp  1.01 
     
Fed's reaction to inflation  Φπ  0.5 
     
S.D. of the technology shock  σz  0.0075 
Persistence in the technology shock  ρz  0.95 
S.D. of the inflation shock    σπ  0.0040 
Persistence in the inflation shock  ρπ  0.97   35
 
 
Table 2:  Welfare Effects of a Steady-State 10 percent Inflation Rate 
  Effects on Steady-State Values (Percent) 
  Compensating Variation 
As Percent of: 
  Y C L W  K/Y    C Y 
No taxes  - 0.44  - 0.44  - 0.02    0.00    0.00     0.49   0.36 
Taxes w/o capital gains   - 0.36  - 0.36  - 0.06    0.00    0.00     0.44   0.34 
Taxes incl. capital gains                
     Accrual-based  -12.13  - 8.49  + 1.16  - 9.28  -14.69    7.03 5.59 
     Realization-based  - 2.98  - 2.09  + 0.22  - 2.01  - 3.25    1.79 1.41 
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Table 3:  Second Moments (HP Filtered) 
Panel A:   ρπ= 0.97 and φπ = 0.375 
    
U.S. data 
  1955:1 – 1979:3 
No Capital Gains 
Tax 
Capital Gains Tax: 
Accrual-Based* 
Capital Gains Tax: 
Realization-Based
    SD(•) Corr(•,y) SD(•) Corr(•,y) SD(•) Corr(•,y) SD(•) Corr(•,y)
      Output  1.77 -- 1.33 -- 1.42 -- 1.41 -- 
      Consumption  0.84 0.83 0.59 0.97 0.67 0.52 0.72 0.47 
      Investment  5.21 0.79 4.04 0.99 5.68 0.93 5.77 0.92 
      Hours  1.91 0.87 0.67 0.89 0.98 0.82 0.94 0.82 
      Productivity  1.23 0.61 0.80 0.92 0.83 0.74 0.83 0.76 
  
          
Panel B:   ρπ= 0.84 and φπ = 0.5 
    
U.S. data 
  1979:4 – 2003:4  
No Capital Gains 
Tax 
Capital Gains Tax: 
Accrual-Based* 
Capital Gains Tax: 
Realization-Based
    SD(•) Corr(•,y) SD(•) Corr(•,y) SD(•) Corr(•,y) SD(•) Corr(•,y)
      Output  1.37 -- 1.30 -- 1.30 -- 1.29 -- 
      Consumption  0.72 0.80 0.55 0.98 0.55 0.98 0.56 0.97 
      Investment  4.47 0.80 4.01 0.99 4.09 0.99 4.06 0.99 
      Hours  1.65 0.89 0.53 0.98 0.54 0.98 0.52 0.98 
      Productivity  0.88 0.36 0.79 0.99 0.79 0.99 0.79 0.99 











Realized and Unreported Capital Gains in Response
to a Persistent 10 Percent Shock to the Capital Gains Tax 
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38Figure 3
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40Figure 5
Contribution of Monetary Policy Shocks
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41Figure 6: Sensitivity of Cyclical Variability to Model Assumptions
Note: Boxes mark the pre October 1979 policy calibration
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